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History of the Constitutional Treaty’s Rejection 
and Implications for the Future 
Richard E. Baldwin* 
 
1. Introduction 
The French and Dutch no-votes were a huge blow 
to the Constitutional Treaty. The deadline for 
ratification is suspended and as of early 2006, 
neither the French nor the Dutch government had 
a plan for reversing the fatal votes. In short, there 
is no plan for putting the Constitution into force.  
What is the EU’s next step? 
The full answer to this question is unknowable at 
this point, but any answer must surely take into 
account the ‘trail to failure’ – the sequence of 
events that led up to the Constitution. The goal of 
this policy brief is to identify the political 
economy logic behind the chain of events that 
produced the Constitution. This is a critical task 
as far as the future is concerned. The French and 
Dutch votes mean that the political economy 
forces that produced the Constitution are still in 
operation and likely to produce a future event. To 
understand the nature and timing of this future 
event – the EU’s next step – we must thoroughly 
investigate past events. We must dissect the 
problems that the Constitution was intended to 
redress, carefully distinguishing between urgent 
and obvious problems on the one hand, and less 
urgent and less obvious problems on the other. 
The urgent and obvious problems are things the 
EU must address and thus probably will address in 
the coming years.  
It is impossible to allocate problems to the two 
categories with certainty, but the past behaviour of 
EU leaders provides important clues. ‘Revealed 
preference reasoning’ is the jargon that economists 
use for this type of analysis. The idea is that one 
learns about people’s beliefs only when hard choices 
are made;  talk is cheap.  This is especially important 
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when it comes to the Constitution since the 
argumentation has been extremely woolly and has been 
intentionally distorted by many participants in the debate.  
The rest of the paper is organised around two questions: 
“How did the EU end up needing a Constitutional 
Treaty?” and “What are the likely implications for the 
future?” 
2.  How did the EU end up needing the 
Constitutional Treaty?  
The Constitutional Treaty is a bit of a puzzle. EU leaders 
never explicitly asked for a constitution – a fact that is 
certainly strange for a major step in European integration. 
When EU leaders wanted to complete the Internal 
Market, they asked the Commission to draw up a plan 
and then unanimously and explicitly called for 
completion of the Internal Market in the first paragraph 
of the Conclusions to the Milan European Council (June 
1985).
1 When they wanted a single currency, the 
Conclusions of the Hanover European Council (June 
1988) explicitly embraced the goal and told the European 
Commission to come up with a plan, which, after a 
sequence of unanimous and explicit approvals from EU 
leaders, led to the Maastricht Treaty.  
In sharp contrast, the C-word never entered in the 
leaders’ unanimously agreed statements (the Conclusions 
of European Council summits) before the Laeken 
Declaration. Quite simply, there was never unanimous 
agreement that the EU needed a Constitution, although of 
course the idea had been around forever and some 
member states had always supported the idea. Yet in 
                                                        
1 Paragraph 1 of the Conclusions reads: “[The European 
Council] instructed the Council [of Ministers] to initiate a 
precise programme of action, based on the white paper and 
the conditions on the basis of which customs union had been 
brought about, with a view to achieving completely and 
effectively the conditions for a single market in the 
Community by 1992 at the latest, in accordance with stages 
fixed in relation to previously determined priorities and a 
binding timetable.” This quickly led to the Single European 
Act. 
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2004, the heads of state or government of all EU25 
signed the Constitutional Treaty and committed 
themselves to ratify it within two years. How did the EU 
come to need a Constitution that it had done without for a 
half century and five enlargements? The trail, in my 
view, begins in the early 1990s. 
2.1  The trailhead: Enlargement-linked reform 
of EU institutions and the 1996 IGC 
At their June 1993 summit in Copenhagen, EU12 leaders 
confirmed that the Central and Eastern European nations 
would eventually become EU members.
2 From this point, 
it was clear to everyone that EU institutions and 
procedures would have to be reformed.
3 Structures 
designed for six members were groaning under the 
weight of 12 members. Adding more than a dozen 
newcomers would surely bring down the house.  
The quest for enlargement-linked reform of EU 
institutions began formally in December 1993. The 
Brussels European Council
4 added these issues to the 
agenda of the Intergovernmental Conference that was to 
be held in 1996 (an IGC in 1996 was stipulated by the 
1992 Maastricht Treaty).
5  In June 1994, the Corfu 
European Council set up a Reflection Group to prepare 
for the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. This group is 
worth thinking about since its findings highlighted the 
enlargement-related problems that the EU has yet to 
tackle despite 10 years of trying. The group consisted of 
member state representatives and the President of the 
Commission, Jacques Santer. It job was to study 
institutional reforms necessary to keep the EU on track 
after enlargement. In setting up the group, the Corfu 
                                                        
2 Conclusions of the Presidency, Copenhagen, June 21-22 
1993 (SN 180/1/93 REV 1); Paragraph 7.A (iii). 
3 The IGC 1996, which was called for in the Maastricht 
Treaty, had its agenda expanded to include enlargement-
related institutional reform issues by the European Council 
at its first meeting after it agreed to admit the Central and 
Eastern European Countries. For an early academic analysis, 
see Baldwin (1994); this argued that enlargement would 
require a reduction of the power of small nations if the EU 
was to maintain its ability to act post-enlargement.  
4 Presidency conclusions - Brussels, 10 and 11 December 
1993, SN 373/93, Declaration in Annex III. 
5 The 1996 IGC was set up by Art. N of the Maastricht 
Treaty: “A conference of representatives of the governments 
of the Member States shall be convened in 1996 to examine 
those provisions of this Treaty for which revision is 
provided, in accordance with the objectives set out in 
Articles A and B.” The relevant bit of Art. B is: “To 
maintain in full the ‘acquis communautaire’ and build on it 
with a view to considering, through the procedure referred 
to in Article N(2), to what extent the policies and forms of 
cooperation introduced by this Treaty may need to be 
revised with the aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the 
mechanisms and the institutions of the Community” 
(emphasis added). 
European Council explicitly mentioned two issues that its 
members should address: 
•  Council of Minister voting (specifically, weighting of 
votes and the threshold for qualified majority 
decisions); and 
•  Number of members of the Commission.
6  
The critical point here is that as far back as 1993, all EU 
leaders agreed that the Eastern enlargement made EU 
institutional reform – especially Council voting and 
Commission composition – critical. These were urgent 
and obvious problems. 
The Reflection Group’s report, also known as the 
Westendorp Report, was delivered to the European 
Council after 18 months of thinking about the future of 
Europe.
7 The report presents the consensus it found on 
the nature of the problems facing Europe, especially 
those arising from enlargement-related pressures. This 
part of the report is remarkable from the perspective of 
2006 since the list of problems is so similar to those 
tackled by the Constitutional Treaty. The report also lays 
out a thorough lack of consensus as to the solution of 
these problems. This part of the report is remarkable from 
today’s point of view since the disagreements – big 
member vs small member, federalists vs 
intergovernmentalist, etc. – are almost identical to those 
that made negotiation of the Amsterdam, Nice and 
Constitutional Treaties so difficult. This dichotomy – 
general agreement on the problems but general 
disagreement on the solutions – has characterised every 
step of the ‘trail to failure’ up to and including many of 
the national debates on the Constitutional Treaty.  
The 1996 IGC’s agenda (set out in the March 1996 Turin 
European Council’s Conclusions) extracted the essence 
of the Westendorp Report by listing three areas of focus 
for the IGC’s work:  
1.  A Union closer to its citizens 
Under this heading appears a grab-bag of concerns, but 
the first and last sentences sound very much like some of 
the goal’s of the Constitutional Treaty: “The European 
Council asks the IGC to base its work on the fact that the 
citizens are at the core of the European construction: the 
                                                        
6 Verbatim, the assigned task was to: “… elaborate options 
in the perspective of the future enlargement of the Union on 
the institutional questions set out in the conclusions of the 
European Council in Brussels and in the Ioannina 
agreement. (weighting of votes, the threshold for qualified 
majority decisions, number of members of the Commission 
and any other measure deemed necessary to facilitate the 
work of the Institutions and guarantee their effective 
operation in the perspective of enlargement.)” The typos are 
in the original document. See Section IV. Preparation of the 
1996 Intergovernmental Conference; (Conclusions of the 
Corfu European Council, 24-25 June 1994, Nr: 00150/94). 
7 http://www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement/cu/agreements/ 
reflex1_en.htm. History of the Constitutional Treaty’s Rejection and Implications for the Future | 3 
 
Union has the imperative duty to respond concretely to 
their needs and concerns.” And: “The IGC must ensure a 
better application and enforcing of the principle of 
subsidiarity, to provide transparency and openness in the 
Union's work, and to consider whether it would be 
possible to simplify and consolidate the Treaties.” 
2.  The institutions in a more democratic and efficient 
Union 
The institutional reforms listed here have an eerie 
resemblance to those discussed five years later in the 
Laeken Declaration.
8 To summarise, the questions the 
IGC’s work should focus on were: 
How to simplifying legislative procedures, making them 
clearer and more transparent? 
How much to widen the application of majority voting 
(versus unanimity) in the Council of Ministers? 
How to involve the European Parliament? 
How and to what extent national parliaments should be 
involved? 
How Council of Minister voting should be reformed, 
especially vote weighting and the threshold for qualified 
majority decisions? 
How to reform the Commission’s composition in the 
light of enlargement? 
3.  A strengthened capacity for external action of the 
Union 
                                                        
8 Here is the text verbatim: “In order to improve the 
European Union's institutions, and also in view of preparing 
the future enlargement, the Heads of State or Government 
stress the need to look for the best means to ensure that they 
function with greater efficiency, coherence and legitimacy. 
The Conference will have to examine: 
-  the most effective means of simplifying legislative 
procedures and making them clearer and more 
transparent ; 
-  the possibility of widening the scope of co-decision in 
truly legislative matters; 
-  the question of the role of the European Parliament 
besides its legislative powers, as well as its composition 
and the uniform procedure for its election. 
The IGC should equally examine how and to what extent 
national parliaments could, also collectively, better 
contribute to the Union's tasks. 
As regards the Council, whose functioning must be 
improved, the IGC should address the questions of the 
extent of majority voting, the weighting of votes and the 
threshold for qualified majority decisions. 
The Conference will have to examine how the Commission 
can fulfil its fundamental functions with greater efficiency, 
having regard also to its composition and taking into 
account its representativity” (Turin European Council 
Conclusions, 29 March 1996). See footnote 5 for a 
comparison of the original agenda set out in 1992. 
Under this heading were listed many questions that 
resemble those considered by the European Convention.  
Institutional reform as a pre-condition for enlargement 
Reform of EU institutions was a pre-condition for 
enlargement, but this assertion was only progressively 
reinforced. In the June 1993 Conclusions that announced 
the enlargement would eventually happen, it was merely 
implicit.
9 The Essen Conclusions (December 1994) 
strengthened it by stating; “…institutional conditions for 
ensuring the proper functioning of the Union must be 
created  at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference”
10 
(emphasis added). When the IGC was formally launched 
in December 1995 in the Madrid Conclusions, a 
dominant goal was enlargement-related institutional 
reform.
11 
Summary 
Before moving on, it is worth summing up the ‘revealed 
preference’ lessons from this period. By the mid-1990s, 
EU leaders unanimously agreed that Eastern enlargement 
would require reform of the EU institutions. They agreed 
unanimously that the problems stemmed from the fact 
that enlargement would swell the number of members. 
They also unanimously agreed that this posed urgent and 
obvious problems for the Council of Ministers’ voting 
rules and the composition of the Commission – problems 
that had to be solved if the enlarged EU was to continue 
to operate with “efficiency, coherence and legitimacy”. 
Finally, there was unanimous agreement that it would be 
wiser to agree the reforms before the Eastern enlargement 
talks started. That way the Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEECs) would know what they were trying to 
join. The latter assertion started a pattern whereby EU 
leaders asserted that Eastern enlargement could not 
proceed unless the urgent and obvious problems were 
solved. As borne out by history, their bluff has been 
called three times.  
                                                        
9 “The Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while 
maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also 
an important consideration in the general interest of both the 
Union and the candidate countries.” Conclusions of the 
Presidency, Copenhagen, June 21-22 1993 (SN 180/1/93 
REV 1); Paragraph 7.A (iii). 
10 “The European Council has decided to boost and improve 
the process of further preparing the associated States of 
Central and Eastern Europe for accession. It is doing so in 
the knowledge that the institutional conditions for ensuring 
the proper functioning of the Union must be created at the 
1996 Intergovernmental Conference, which for that reason 
must take place before accession negotiations begin.” 
11 “In this connection, having welcomed the Reflection 
Group's report, the European Council decided to launch the 
Intergovernmental Conference on 29 March 1996 in order to 
establish the political and institutional conditions for 
adapting the European Union to present and future needs, 
particularly with a view to the next enlargement”  Madrid 
European Council, December 1995, Part A, Introduction.  4 | Richard E. Baldwin 
 
2.2  Amsterdam Treaty: Failure #1 
While the ambitions for the Amsterdam Treaty were 
high, the 1996 IGC proved very difficult; the 
disagreements identified in the Westendorp Report 
proved intractable. But the IGC did not end in failure. It 
produced a Treaty that was a success from the 
perspective of its original intent as set out in the 
Maastricht Treaty. In fact the Amsterdam Treaty is best 
thought of as a tidying up of the Maastricht Treaty. The 
substantive additions included a more substantial EU role 
in social policy (UK Prime Minister Tony Blair cancelled 
the British opt-out of the Social Charter), a bit more 
power for the European Parliament and the notion of 
flexible integration, i.e. the so-called ‘closer cooperation’ 
which would allow sub-groups of EU members to pursue 
deeper integration initiatives. From the perspective of the 
Turin Conclusion’s agenda and the Essen Conclusion’s 
dictum, however, the Amsterdam Treaty was a total 
failure.  
For the purposes of this policy brief, the key lesson from 
1996 IGC’s troubles is the list of essential reforms that 
emerged. When EU leaders study an issue (as in the 
Westendorp Report) or draw up an agenda (as in Turin), 
one observes a great deal of mixing up of critical issues – 
issues that absolutely must be part of any grand bargain 
that solves the urgent and obvious problems – and 
tangential wish-list issues. While many wish-issues are 
included in the grand-bargain package in order to make 
the reform package politically palatable to all member 
states, they are not the heart of the matter. Other forms of 
sweeteners could equally well take their place. To put it 
differently, hard-fought negotiations like the 1996 IGC 
act as a sort of ‘natural selection’ on agenda items. Very 
soon all participants realise which issues are urgent and 
obvious and which issues are ‘sweeteners’. As mentioned 
in the introduction, it is handy to know which issues are 
urgent and obvious when thinking about the EU’s next 
step.  
In the case of the IGC, EU leaders identified three critical 
urgent and obvious problems that they could not solve 
but which they nevertheless agreed needed to be solved 
before enlargement. This list is found in the Amsterdam 
Treaty’s “Protocol on the institutions with the prospect of 
enlargement of the European Union”.
12 Moreover, the 
                                                        
12 The Protocol reflects the state of the deadlocked 
negotiations in which the Council voting and Commission 
composition issues are linked: “At the date of entry into 
force of the first enlargement of the Union, … the 
Commission shall comprise one national of each of the 
Member States, provided that, by that date, the weighting of 
the votes in the Council has been modified, whether by re-
weighting of the votes or by dual majority, in a manner 
acceptable to all Member States, taking into account all 
relevant elements, notably compensating those Member 
States which give up the possibility of nominating a second 
member of the Commission.”  The Protocol then goes on to 
call for another IGC to finish the enlargement-linked EU 
Protocol provides much more information than a simple 
list. The Protocol reads like a snapshot taken of the 
negotiating positions when the Chairman called ‘time’ 
and the participants agreed to disagree. It states:  
At the date of entry into force of the first enlargement 
of the Union, … the Commission shall comprise one 
national of each of the Member States, provided that, 
by that date, the weighting of the votes in the Council 
has been modified, whether by re-weighting of the 
votes or by dual majority, in a manner acceptable to 
all Member States, taking into account all relevant 
elements, notably compensating those Member States 
which give up the possibility of nominating a second 
member of the Commission. 
Despite this failure,
13 the EU leaders’ bluff was called 
and accession talks with the CEECs were opened at the 
Luxembourg summit (December 1997). This put the 
CEECs and the EU in the awkward situation of 
negotiating membership when everyone knew that the 
Union that the CEECs were trying to join would change 
during the negotiations.
14  
At the Cologne June 1999 European Council meeting, 
EU leaders agreed to a list of issues that had to be solved 
before the enlargement – the so called ‘Amsterdam 
leftovers’ – and then agreed to launch a new IGC in 2000. 
The ‘leftovers’ were almost identical to the heart of the 
1996 IGC’s agenda on institutional reform. Here is the 
list: 
•  Composition of the European Commission; 
•  Council of Ministers’ qualified majority voting rules; 
and 
                                                                                              
reform: “At least one year before the membership of the 
European Union exceeds twenty, a conference of 
representatives of the governments of the Member States 
shall be convened in order to carry out a comprehensive 
review of the provisions of the Treaties on the composition 
and functioning of the institutions.” 
13 The inclusion of the Protocol list makes it obvious that the 
1996 IGC failed to achieve the goal of implementing 
enlargement-related reforms. The admission of failure is 
made even more explicit by a declaration added by France, 
Italy and Belgium to the Treaty (Declaration 57), which 
states: “… the Treaty of Amsterdam does not meet the need, 
reaffirmed at the Madrid European Council, for substantial 
progress towards reinforcing the institutions”. 
14 For the CEECs this made little difference. For them EU 
membership was a matter of national security. Having lived 
five decades under Soviet control, they wanted to be make 
sure that the next Iron Curtain would go down to the east of 
their borders, not to the west. Indeed, the very different 
situation in which Poland and Ukraine find themselves in 
2006 with respect to growing Russian assertiveness seems to 
justify the CEECs’ ‘EU-or-bust’ attitude in the 1990s and 
early 2000s.  History of the Constitutional Treaty’s Rejection and Implications for the Future | 5 
 
•  Reduction in the number of issues decided by 
unanimity in the Council rather than by qualified 
majority voting. 
15 
Importantly, the leaders also said that they would not 
enlarge the EU before the ‘Amsterdam leftovers’ were 
cleaned up: “As a prerequisite for enlargement of the 
Union, the operation of the institutions must be 
strengthened and improved in keeping with the 
institutional provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty.” 
(Luxembourg European Council Conclusions, paragraph 
3).
16  
  Enlargement as hostage: Take two 
Just as the opening of accession talks was supposed to 
have been held hostage to the outcome of the 1996 IGC, 
the Luxembourg Conclusions stated that enlargement 
itself was to be held hostage to the outcome of the 2000 
IGC. The necessary institutional reforms generally 
harmed the interests of small members compared to those 
of large members (cutting the Commission size to less 
than one Commissioner per country would harm small 
members more since they rely more on the Commission 
to look after their interests than do large members, and 
every Council voting reform that improved decision-
making efficiency did so by cutting the weight of small 
members’ votes).
17 The enlargement-as-hostage tactic 
meant that the big members could blame the small 
members if the 2000 IGC failed and the enlargement was 
postponed. As history would have it, the big nations took 
full advantage of this angle to push their national 
interests.  
 Summary 
The lessons from this first failure to address the urgent 
and obvious enlargement-related problems are rich in 
importance for the future. EU leaders reaffirmed their 
unanimous agreement that enlargement – in particular the 
                                                        
15 Paragraph 52 of the Cologne Conclusions calls for the 
IGC 2000. Paragraph 53 sets out the ‘leftovers’ list: 
“In accordance with the Amsterdam Protocol on the 
institutions with the prospect of enlargement of the 
European Union and the declarations made with regard to it, 
the brief of the Intergovernmental Conference will cover the 
following topics: 
-  size and composition of the Commission; 
-  weighting of votes in the Council (re-weighting, 
introduction of a dual majority and threshold for 
qualified-majority decision-making); 
-  possible extension of qualified-majority voting in the 
Council. (Presidency Conclusions - Cologne 3 and 4 
June 1999, 150/99 REV 1).” 
Note that this list is also in Declaration 57 of the Amsterdam 
Treaty. 
16 With hindsight, it is curious that the summit that called the 
Essen summit’s bluff set out a new bluff of its own.  
17 See, for example, the analysis in Baldwin (1994). 
increase in the number of members, especially small 
members – made EU institutional reform imperative. 
Hard bargaining and thinking between 1993 and 1997 
whittled down the list of ‘must do’ tasks to just two: 
Council of Ministers voting rules (vote allocation and 
areas subject to majority voting) and Commission 
composition. Although these are exactly the issues 
highlighted in the June 1994 Corfu Conclusions, the fact 
that were still on the ‘A list’ after years of bargaining is 
important from the revealed-preference reasoning 
perspective. It indicates that these two areas really are the 
key reforms necessitated by enlargement according to the 
judgement of the men and women who are best placed to 
know.  
2.3  Nice Treaty: Failure #2 
The prime goals of the Nice Treaty were to adopt reforms 
that would maintain the Union’s democratic legitimacy 
and its ability to act.
18 Thus the IGC focused on the 
Amsterdam leftovers:   
•  Weighting of votes in the Council, 
•  Extension of the use of majority voting in the 
Council to areas currently subject to unanimity and 
•  Size and composition of the Commission. 
At the June 2009 Feira summit, EU15 leaders added a 
fourth agenda item, namely: 
•  Closer cooperation, which subsequently came to be 
called ‘Enhanced Cooperation’.  
The 2000 IGC lasted about a year, with frequent meetings 
of national experts laying extensive groundwork for the 
institutional reforms. A handful of options for each of the 
four main areas were developed in preparation for the 
Summit.
19  
Given the Council of Minister’s critical role in the EU’s 
decision-making and the critical role of Council voting 
procedures in determining individual member’s 
influence, voting rules had to be at the heart of any grand 
bargain on EU institutional reform.
20 As had been 
mentioned in several Conclusions and the Amsterdam 
Treaty,
21 there were two main options for Council voting. 
The first was to retain the Qualified Majority Voting 
(QMV) scheme that had been in operation since the 
Treaty of Rome, but to re-jigger the allocation of Council 
votes in a way that would allow the Union to act even 
after enlargement. This option would hurt small 
                                                        
18 The section is based on Baldwin et al. (2001). 
19 The 2000 IGC was the first where almost everything was 
posted on the web. See europa.eu.int/comm/archives/ 
igc2000/index_en.htm for the compete archives. 
20 This is clear in the Amsterdam Treaty’s Protocol on 
institutions reproduced in footnote 12. 
21 See e.g. Treaty of Amsterdam’s Protocol on the 
institutions with the prospect of enlargement of the 
European Union, Article 1.  6 | Richard E. Baldwin 
 
members.
22 Because the contemporaneous voting rules 
gave small members far more votes than population-
proportionality would suggest and because the Eastern 
enlargement would bring in many small and very small 
members, any viable re-weighting would have to reduce 
the power of small members. The second option was 
more radical, to shift to a ‘dual majority’ system, i.e. one 
where a qualified majority would have to consist of 
nations that represented at least X% of the EU population 
and at least Y% of the member states – a system akin to 
the bicameral democratic procedures in many EU nations 
where X and Y are usually 50%.
23 The impact of this 
option on small nations is much more mixed since in 
essence it gives each nation’s vote two weights – one 
proportional to its share of EU population and here small 
states would lose, and one proportional to the number of 
members and here the small nations, especially the 
smallest would gain.
24  
2.3.1  The lost weekend 
EU leaders met in the French city of Nice on Thursday, 7 
December 2000, to wrap up the year-long IGC talks and 
to sign a new treaty. France had the Presidency of the EU 
at the time, so the Nice Summit was under the guidance 
of French President Jacques Chirac. Chirac used the 
power of the chair to launch a stratagem that goes a long 
way to explaining the Nice Treaty’s failure. Rather than 
adopting one of the carefully thought-out and well-
prepared ‘vote re-weighting’, or ‘dual majority’ options 
discussed in the IGC, Chirac pulled out a brand-new, 
highly complex proposal on Council voting – a proposal 
that was basically a shotgun marriage of re-weighting and 
dual majority.
25 This tactic threw off the summit’s 
                                                        
22 For a pre-Nice summit analysis of the power and 
efficiency implications of the various 2000 IGC voting 
proposals, see Baldwin et al. (2000).  For an early and less 
sophisticated analysis of the impact of necessary reforms on 
the voting weight of small nations, see Baldwin (1994). 
23 For example, Germany’s lower house represents the 
population (it is elected according to proportional 
representation), while the upper house represents the Lander 
(seat are allocated equally among big and small Lander); 
passing a law requires approval of both – a dual majority.  
24 The dual majority system is like having two thresholds 
and two different weights for the votes of each member. For 
example, pre-Nice Luxembourg had 2 of the 87 votes in the 
EU15 Council of Ministers, i.e. about 2.3% of the votes 
while its population was only 0.1% . Under a dual majority 
system, Luxembourg’s vote would be counted with the 
weight of 0.1% for the population threshold, but 1/15
th i.e. 
6.7% for the member threshold. Whether Luxembourg gains 
or loses power from this switch involves some complicated 
simulations that are explained in many places, including 
Baldwin & Widgren (2004).  
25 For extensive analysis of the Nice voting rules’ impact on 
decision-making efficiency, democratic legitimacy and the 
distribution of power among EU institutions, see Baldwin & 
Widgren (2004). 
timetable, forcing an extension since EU leaders had 
promised themselves that enlargement could not proceed 
unless they addressed the ‘Amsterdam leftovers’ and no 
one wanted to be blamed for delaying the enlargement. 
The motives of Chirac in adopting this stance are subject 
to dispute (see Box 1 for my view) and the implications 
of it were not immediately clear.   
Box 1. What did Chirac gain from the stratagem? 
France had always viewed the French-German duo as the 
motor of European integration with the Franco-German 
voting parity as an unspoken underpinning of the 
partnership (France and Germany had always had the 
same number of votes in the Council of Ministers). Up 
until the 1989 unification, this voting parity was natural 
given the near parity of the French and German 
populations; indeed, each of the four big EU members – 
Britain, France, Germany and Italy – had about 60 
million citizens and 10 votes in the Council. Post-1989, 
however, Germany had about 80 million people, but no 
one suggested that Germany should have more votes – no 
one, that is, until the 1996 and 2000 IGCs got going.  
The voting reform was driven by the impeding 
expansion of the number of EU members, especially 
small members. And because the EU’s pre-Nice system 
granted far more votes to small members than their 
populations would suggest, there was no logical way of 
fixing the system without addressing the vote-population 
connection. Of course, the imperative was not coming 
from Germany’s shortfall of votes – it was coming from 
the over-allocation of votes to small members – but any 
logically consistent solution to the over-allocation of 
small nation votes would break the Franco-German 
parity. Chirac was just not willing to go down in history 
as the President that allowed France to become the junior 
partner in the Franco-German duo. 
By proposing that votes be re-weighted in favour of the 
big nations (maintaining parity among the four big 
nations’ votes) while simultaneously adding the two 
‘dual-majority’ thresholds – a minimum number of 
members in a winning coalition and a minimum share of 
the EU population represented by the winning coalition – 
Chirac managed to fuzz the issues enough to make is 
seem reasonable that votes should be brought more in line 
with populations, but only at the lower end of the 
population scale.  
At 4:15 on Sunday morning under a hazy full moon, the 
longest European Council meeting in history announced 
political agreement on a new Treaty. Due to Chirac’s 
stratagem, the leaders did not have a legal text in front of 
them, so there as no actual Treaty for them to sign. 
Indeed, the summit ended before everything was settled; 
it took two months of post-summit negotiations to 
finalise the Nice Treaty and some numerical 
inconsistencies were left in the Treaty.
26 The final signing 
ceremony took place on 26 February 2001.  
                                                        
26 Declaration 20 of the Final Act says the Council vote 
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At the end, the small nations sacrificed power to allow 
the enlargement to proceed. In exchange, the Nice 
summit Conclusions had to declare the Nice Treaty a 
success and the enlargement could proceed. The Nice 
European Council Conclusions state: 
This new treaty strengthens the legitimacy, 
effectiveness and public acceptability of the 
institutions and enables the Union’s firm 
commitment to the enlargement process to be 
reaffirmed. The European Council considers that, as 
from the date of entry into force of the Treaty of 
Nice, the Union will be in a position to welcome new 
Member States once they have demonstrated their 
ability to assume the obligations of accession and the 
negotiations have been brought to a successful 
conclusion.
27  
Three days later, Chirac told the European Parliament 
that the Nice reforms would be enough to allow the EU to 
function effectively and legitimately even after enlarging 
the club from 15 to 27. The transcript from the European 
Parliament (www.europarl.eu.int/dg7/debats/data/en/00-
12-12.en) reads: 
We feel satisfied that we overcame the difficulties 
blocking the path towards the much sought-after aim 
of fulfilling the commitments that were given at 
Helsinki to the candidate countries without 
destroying the Union, of enabling tomorrow’s Europe 
to continue to function effectively. I think I can say 
that we met these conditions. … It responds to the 
challenge we were presented with, which was to 
provide the Union with the ability to take decisions 
and to act once Europe has gone ahead with 
enlargement on an unprecedented scale. … As we 
promised, there are no leftovers from Nice.
28  
                                                                                              
says that once all the listed nations are in and we have an 
EU27, the blocking minority is 91, which implies a winning 
threshold of 345-90=255, which is notably different than 
258, at least to anyone with a calculator to hand. Another 
oddity is with the threshold expressed in percentages. 
Declaration 21 says that while the enlargement has not yet 
been completed (i.e. not all 12 have joined), the Council 
vote threshold will move, “according to the pace of 
accessions, from a percentage below the current one to a 
maximum of 73.4%. When all the candidate countries 
mentioned above have acceded, the blocking minority, in a 
Union of 27, will be raised to 91 votes, and the qualified 
majority threshold resulting from the table given in the 
Declaration on enlargement of the European Union will be 
automatically adjusted accordingly.” The QMV threshold at 
the time was 71.26%, and 91 votes to block in the EU27 
implies a threshold of 73.91%. So where does the 73.4% 
come from? 
27 Presidency Conclusions, Nice European Council Meeting, 
7, 8 and 9 December 2000, paragraph 4. 
28 Some of Chirac’s colleagues on the European Council 
were more realistic. On 11 December 2000, the UK Prime 
Minister told reporters: “As far as Britain's national interest 
in concerned, this was a very successful summit in that we 
2.3.2  The leftovers from Nice 
The complexity of Chirac’s proposal clouded issues for a 
while, but it rapidly became clear that the Treaty of Nice 
was not a success. There were indeed some ‘Nice 
leftovers’ and they were basically the same as the 
Amsterdam leftovers. On Commission reform, the Nice 
Treaty adopted a temporary, makeshift reform – 
temporary since it applied only up till the 27th member 
has joined; and makeshift since a long-term solution was 
not agreed. On the extension of qualified majority voting, 
the Treaty was basically a house-cleaning exercise with 
little or no change in the areas to be subject to majority 
voting. On Council decision-making reform, the Treaty 
of Nice actually made things worse, according to most 
calculations.
29 Having abandoned the months of 
preparatory work, the leaders had little more than hurried, 
late-night staff work and their political instincts to guide 
them. The result was a complex system which failed to 
maintain the EU’s ability to act in an enlarged EU.
30 In 
the end, Nice shifted a lot of power to big members 
without meeting the goal of improving decision-making 
efficiency of the enlarged EU.  
In fact, EU leaders at the Nice summit knew that the 
Treaty was incomplete. As part of the final political deal 
on the Treaty, they agreed to commit themselves to 
another IGC in 2004 in order to complete the reform 
process. This “Declaration on the future of the Union” 
highlighted four themes:  
•  defining a more precise division of powers between 
the EU and its members;  
•  clarifying the status of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights proclaimed in Nice;  
•  making the Treaties easier to understand without 
changing their meaning; and 
•  defining the role of national parliaments in the 
European institutions. 
Importantly, there was no mention of the need for an EU 
constitution. Nor was there any mention of institutional 
reform since EU leaders had to claim that the Nice Treaty 
solved all the enlargement-related institutional issues.  
                                                                                              
achieved everything we set out to achieve, for example on 
tax, social security, defence, more power for Britain within 
the EU. So far as Europe is concerned, we cannot do 
business like this in the future. The ideas that we outlined a 
few weeks ago in Warsaw on how we improve the way we 
work and take decisions have to be part of the agenda for the 
future. We now have the decision we need on enlargement 
but there are real improvements we now have to make in the 
way that we work.” www.pm.gov.uk, Press Briefing: 11am 
Monday 11 December 2000,  
29 See for example, http://www.esi2.us.es/~mbilbao/ 
niza.htm#cont and Baldwin et al. (2001), or studies 
published later such as Kandogan (2005) and Leech & 
Machover (2003).  
30 See Baldwin et al. (2001) for an analysis of the failures. 8 | Richard E. Baldwin 
 
As history would have it, almost the same set of leaders 
who were in Nice on that chilly winter morning 
eventually agreed to a constitution they did not ask for 
because it solved a number of pressing matters – 
basically the four listed above, plus the fix-up of the Nice 
Treaty’s foul-up of institution reform, but that is getting 
ahead of the story.  
2.4  Try #3: The Constitutional Treaty 
Recognition that the Nice Treaty voting rules failed to 
address the urgent and obvious institutional problems 
posed by enlargement took some time. Moreover, EU 
leaders could not explicitly admit their failure because the 
small members were selling the Treaty to their national 
audiences as painful but necessary to allow enlargement 
to proceed. Since urgent and obvious problems still 
needed to be addressed, EU leaders adopted a new tactic. 
Instead of setting up a new IGC, and adding institutional 
reform to its agenda, they unanimously adopted a long 
list of questions that included the urgent and obvious 
problems. Then they set up a Convention to consider 
them.  
2.4.1  The Laeken Declaration, 15 December 
2001 
One year after Nice, the European Council in Laeken 
adopted the “Declaration on the Future of the European 
Union” that started a process leading to the third try at 
EU institutional reform. Given that the 1996 and 2000 
IGCs had failed to produce the necessary reform, and 
especially in light of the difficult Nice Summit talks, the 
Laeken Council decided to try a novel working method. It 
convened the “Convention on the Future of Europe” that 
came to be known as the European Convention. This was 
a gathering of representatives from member state 
governments, national parliaments, the European 
Parliament, the Commission and the candidate countries.  
As its formal name suggests, the Convention was 
supposed to study the fundamental questions that 
enlargement posed for the future of Europe and to define 
various solution. The output of the Convention was then 
to be taken as a point of departure for standard 
intergovernmental negotiations at an IGC.  
  Admitting the Nice failure  
The Laeken Declaration contains a long list of questions 
that the Convention was supposed to consider. The 56 
questions were grouped into four main themes, two of 
which echo those of the Nice Declaration: 
•  A better division and definition of competence in the 
European Union; 
•  Simplification of the Union's instruments; 
•  More democracy, transparency and efficiency in the 
European Union; and 
•  Towards a Constitution for European citizens.  
The Laeken Declaration included two crucial novelties 
compared to the Nice Declaration. First, the Declaration 
contains a volte-face where EU leaders implicitly admit 
that the Nice reforms were insufficient. One of the 
questions that the Convention was to consider was: “How 
we can improve the efficiency of decision-making and 
the workings of the institutions in a Union of some thirty 
Member States.” This is an admission that the Nice 
Treaty was a failure since – as we saw above – 
maintaining the efficiency of the enlarged Union was the 
main goal of Nice Treaty. It is a volte-face since EU 
leaders had asserted at the Conclusions to their December 
2000 meeting in Nice that the Nice Treaty reforms were 
sufficient (see the quotes above).  
From the perspective of 2006, it is striking that the EU 
leaders asked the Convention to consider reforms of 
institutional reforms that a) had been unanimously agreed 
just one year earlier and b) had not yet been tried (the 
Nice Treaty institutional changes took effect only with 
the Eastern enlargement and so had not been tested when 
the Laeken Declaration was written). It shows that the 
shortcomings of the Nice Treaty’s institutional reforms – 
especially the Council voting rules, which are the 
linchpin of EU decision-making – were absolutely 
obvious to EU leaders. So obvious were these 
shortcomings, in fact, that they were willing to take the 
risk that the Convention would un-do the delicate 
political grand-bargain reached in the Nice Treaty’s 
institutional reform – not something that EU leader would 
take lightly since these voting rules are one of the main 
determinants of their influence over EU policies.  
Of course, these institutional reforms, which EU leaders 
implicitly admitted were deficient, are exactly what is in 
force now in 2006 and they are rules that will remain in 
force until a new Treaty is ratified. But once again this is 
getting ahead of the story.  
The second innovation in the Laeken Declaration opened 
the door to what Peter Norman called the ‘Accidental 
Constitution’ (the title of his 2003 book on the 
Convention). While the Nice Declaration made no 
mention of a constitution and the Laeken Declaration did 
not instruct the Convention to write a constitution, the ‘C-
word’ does appear in the Laeken Declaration – two-thirds 
of the way down the Declaration is a section entitled 
“Towards a Constitution for European citizens”. 
Commonsense tells us that EU leaders would not ask for 
something as monumental as a European Constitution in 
such a vague and indirect manner. That was not how they 
asked for the Single Market or the euro. If there had been 
unanimous agreement among the EU15 that a 
constitution was needed, then the Laeken Declaration 
would have explicitly said so.  
Of course, words can mean many things to many people. 
Judge for yourself. Here is the whole relevant section of 
the Laeken Declaration verbatim:  
 History of the Constitutional Treaty’s Rejection and Implications for the Future | 9 
 
       Towards a Constitution for European citizens 
The European Union currently has four Treaties. The 
objectives, powers and policy instruments of the 
Union are currently spread across those Treaties. If 
we are to have greater transparency, simplification is 
essential. 
Four sets of questions arise in this connection. The 
first concerns simplifying the existing Treaties 
without changing their content. Should the distinction 
between the Union and the Communities be 
reviewed? What of the division into three pillars? 
Questions then arise as to the possible reorganisation 
of the Treaties. Should a distinction be made between 
a basic treaty and the other treaty provisions? Should 
this distinction involve separating the texts? Could 
this lead to a distinction between the amendment and 
ratification procedures for the basic treaty and for the 
other treaty provisions? 
Thought would also have to be given to whether the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights should be included in 
the basic treaty and to whether the European 
Community should accede to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
The question ultimately arises as to whether this 
simplification and reorganisation might not lead in 
the long run to the adoption of a constitutional text in 
the Union. What might the basic features of such a 
constitution be? The values which the Union 
cherishes, the fundamental rights and obligations of 
its citizens, the relationship between Member States 
in the Union? 
It would take a very elaborate helix of logic to read this 
and conclude that the European Council really meant to 
say “the Convention should write a fully drafted 
constitution”, but that, of course, is exactly how the 
Chairman of the European Convention read it. And that is 
how the Accidental Constitution was born. 
Peter Ludlow’s excellent book The Laeken Council, 
which was written just after the 2001 meeting and before 
the Convention turned into a constitution-writing body. It 
provides a fascinating account of how the C-word got 
into the document. For instance, it reproduces the draft 
that Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstad took on his 
pre-summit tour of capitals and shows how various 
amendments by various EU members resulted the 
particularly oblique word above. More interestingly, 
Ludlow – one of the ultimate insiders to Europe’s 
machinations – writes that “it is furthermore highly 
questionable whether the 2004 ICG will be able to reach 
agreement. The Union has thus embarked on a highly 
risky venture”. He goes on to list the purposes of the 
future constitution (note that he was writing when it was 
the c-word rather than the C-word). Nothing in his list 
comes close to major institutional reforms like changing 
the Council of Ministers’ voting scheme or changing the 
composition of the Commission.  
2.5  From ‘Convention on the Future of 
Europe’ to constitution-writing 
convention 
The European Convention was run by former French 
President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing with the assistance of 
two Vice-Chairmen. It started slowly and many early 
observers expected its large size and ill-defined 
objectives to result in a muddled outcome. By mid-2002, 
however, President Giscard d’Estaing had managed to 
redefine the Convention’s purpose. The “Convention on 
the Future of Europe” set up by Laeken was transformed 
into a constitution-writing convention. The new goal was 
to present the EU heads of state and government with a 
fully written constitution. From that point forward, the 
tone of the Convention changed and EU member states 
started sending heavy-weight politicians in place of low-
level representatives. All arguments over the need for a 
constitution were dropped; discussion turned instead to 
its content. All of this was done with the full knowledge 
of member states, but no formal acknowledgement.
31 
As Chairman, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was firmly in 
charge. The Convention’s decision-making procedure 
involved no voting by representatives and indeed no 
standard democratic procedure of any kind. The 
Convention was to adopt its recommendations by 
‘consensus’ with Valéry Giscard d’Estaing defining when 
a consensus existed. The representatives of the candidate 
countries participated fully in the debate, but their voices 
were not allowed to prevent a consensus among the 
representatives of the EU15.  
Chairman Giscard d’Estaing had enormous control over 
the debate and final control over the actual text. One 
professor of political science who studied the Convention 
process closely, George Tsebelis, noted that Giscard: 
… expanded the authority of the Convention, and 
shaped the document that it produced. By eliminating 
votes, he enabled the presidium and the secretariat 
(which means himself) to summarise the debates. By 
stretching the concept of agenda in order to place 
issues in the debate, by using time limits as a way of 
limiting possible opponents from making proposals, 
by selecting the staff members himself, and taking 
them away from every possible source of opposition, 
he was able to shape the document in a very efficient 
way. … This is one of the reasons that the process is 
encountering significant problems for ratification 
(Tsebelis, 2005). 
One point where the Chairman’s prerogative was crucial 
was in the list of the working groups that were set up. On 
the issue that would be central to the entire grand bargain, 
the issue that had been central in both the 1996 and 2000 
IGC – namely, the reform of Council of Ministers voting 
                                                        
31 Giscard reported to several European Councils but the 
Conclusions merely took note of the progress. The C-word 
never appeared in the Conclusions of the European Councils 
that listened to Giscard’s progress reports.   10 | Richard E. Baldwin 
 
rules – Giscard chose not to set up a working group. The 
proposal that he pulled out at the last moment and 
included in the near-final draft – a dual-majority scheme 
– attracted a good deal of criticism but Giscard 
suppressed the debate with time limits. The member 
states who knew they stood to lose massive amounts of 
power under Giscard’s scheme decided to hold their fire 
until the 2003 IGC where the elected leaders of the 
member states, not the unelected Giscard, would be in 
control.  
The draft framework that Giscard d’Estaing presented in 
October 2002 was fleshed out into a draft that was 
presented to the June 2003 European Council meeting. 
Leaders of EU15 leaders accepted the draft as a starting 
point for the IGC (Conclusions, Thessaloniki European 
Council, 19 and 20 June 2003). The Commission, as 
required by the Treaty of Rome, gave its opinion on 
convening an IGC; it said the draft Constitution was a 
good start and that the IGC should not unpick the grand 
bargain by opening up the institutional reform question. 
In particular the Commission welcomed the new Council 
voting rule (double majority was the Commission’s 
position in the 1996 and 2000 IGCs), but it questioned 
the draft Treaty’s solution on the composition of the 
Commission.
32  
2.6  The Italian failure: IGC 2003 
The IGC that considered the draft Constitutional Treaty 
started in October 2003. Differences that had been 
papered over by the Convention’s autocratic decision-
making procedure re-emerged. The most contentious 
issues were the same ones that caused trouble for the 
IGCs in 1996 and 2000 – institutional reforms, especially 
of Council of Ministers’ voting and Commission 
composition. In part this may have been due to 
ineffectual management by the Italian Presidency, which 
tiptoed around the most contentious issue – Council of 
Ministers’ voting. The issue was not broached until the 
fifth Ministerial IGC meeting at the end of November 
2003, just weeks before the final December 2003 summit 
that was supposed to approve the Treaty. The 
Commission’s summary of the 28-29 November 2003 
‘conclave’ in Naples says it all: “As for the most 
contentious issue, i.e. double-majority voting in the 
Council, the Conference discussed the principle itself 
(double majority proposed by the Convention or retention 
of the voting system provided for in the Treaty of Nice) 
and the various proposals for amendment of States' 
                                                        
32 As Baldwin et al. (2001) show using a mathematical 
model of voting, double majority increases the 
Commission’s power by making the Council of Ministers 
less of a choke-point on EU decision-making. Since the 
Commission has the monopoly on initiative in the EU 
decision-making structure – i.e. the Commission has the first 
mover advantage – anything that makes the whole process 
more efficient gives the Commission more leeway in 
crafting proposals.   
thresholds and population necessary to adopt a legislative 
measure. The Presidency did not make any specific 
proposals.” (europa.eu.int) 
It is worth going into some detail on the negotiating 
history of the voting rules, since these rules still need to 
be fixed, and the debate in the 2003 IGC provides a good 
deal of information on what sort of arrangements could 
attract unanimous support of the EU25 (the 1996 and 
2000 IGCs were conducted by the EU15, and the issue 
was decided by Giscard in the Convention, so the IGC 
2003 is the best source of information on what member 
states’ positions might be in any future revision of the 
Nice Treaty rules). The Commission website’s summary 
of the debate states: 
The Italian Presidency was unable to make a concrete 
proposal by the end of its six-month period. 
However, it proposed several options, which were 
presented informally to the delegations: 
-  preservation of the system laid down by the 
Treaty of Nice; 
-  establishment of a rendez-vous clause; 
-  agreement on the principle of the double majority, 
but with modified thresholds; 
-  preservation of the Convention's proposal. 
None of these options was acceptable to all States 
and, when the Irish Presidency took over, there was 
still complete disagreement. 
The final draft produced by the Italian Presidency was 
rejected by the European Council in December 2003. 
Although many members had problems with many parts 
of the draft, the final hold-up was the voting rules which 
greatly reduced the voting power of Spain and Poland 
(compared to the Nice Treaty rules) and greatly increased 
the voting power of Germany (see Baldwin & Widgren, 
2003a, for a formal analysis of the power implications of 
the various rules).  
2.7  The Irish Presidency’s compromise 
Given this failure, enlargement and the European 
Parliament’s election proceeded without agreement on 
the new Treaty. The next European Council to consider 
the Treaty consisted of 25 members. Importantly, the 
Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar, who so 
forcefully opposed the new voting rules in December 
2003, lost his national election and the new Prime 
Minister, José Luis Zapatero, proved more flexible on the 
voting issue. This, combined with skilful diplomacy by 
the Irish Presidency, permitted a grudging and difficult 
but ultimately unanimous acceptance of the Irish 
Presidency’s draft of the Constitution at the June 2004 
summit of EU25 leaders.   History of the Constitutional Treaty’s Rejection and Implications for the Future | 11 
 
Figure 1. Winners and losers under the Nice rules and Constitution voting rules 
Note: CT stands for Constitutional Treaty. 
Source: Baldwin & Widgren (2004) (downloadable from http://shop.ceps.be). 
 
The final compromise was a combination of the Italian 
Presidency’s first and third options. The Constitutional 
Treaty retains the Nice Treaty rules up to November 2009 
(to assuage Poland and Spain who lose so much power 
under the new rules) and it modifies Giscard’s double-
majority scheme by switching the majority thresholds 
from 50% to 55% of the member states and from 60% to 
65% of the population (this increased all members’ power 
to block a proposal).  
It is worth noting that the Constitutional Treaty’s fix-up 
of the Nice Treaty’s foul-up undid the aim of Chirac’s 
stratagem by breaking the parity between France and 
Germany. On the population threshold, Germany’s vote 
counted about one-third more than France’s; on the 
members’ threshold, France, Germany and Malta’s votes 
all counted the same. One wonders whether there would 
have been a Constitution if Chirac had pressed the case 
for a double majority back in December 2000. 
Figure 1 shows which nations win and lose from the Nice 
rules (compared to the pre-Nice rules that were in effect 
for the first few months after the May 2004 enlargement) 
and from the Nice rules that are today in operation and 
the Constitutional Treaty rules that would go into effect if 
the Treaty is ratified. The reason for Spain and Poland’s 
resistance in the IGC 2003 is quite obvious from the 
figure, as is Germany’s rather strong support for the 
Treaty. 
2.8 Summary 
The Constitutional Treaty is a complex document that 
contains half a dozen radical changes in the EU’s 
structure. It removes the three pillars that were put in 
place in the Maastricht Treaty to prevent ‘creeping 
competencies’. It makes the Social Charter (i.e. Charter 
of Fundamental Rights) part of EU law. It creates a new 
way to make some modifications to the Treaty without 
the possibility of referendums (Passerelle). And, last but 
not least, it solves the urgent and obvious institutional 
reform issues that the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties 
failed to resolve satisfactorily – especially those 
concerning Council of Ministers’ voting and composition 
of the Commission. The Treaty also contains a large 
number of other changes, many of which do not really 
need a Treaty change to implement. The bulk of the 
Treaty, however, is merely a reorganisation of the 
existing Treaties (the Constitutional Treaty repeals all the 
other Treaties). 
The key point, for the purposes of this paper, is that the 
Constitutional Treaty’s treatment of Council voting tells 
us a great deal about what EU leaders think about the 
Nice Treaty rules. The Nice Treaty voting rules were 
unanimously agreed by all EU15 leaders and all 15 
members ratified these changes. But even before the Nice 
Treaty rules were due to go into effect, the EU15 leaders 
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agreed to a radically different set of voting rules – ones 
that lead to important shifts in member states’ power and 
an enormous increase in EU decision-making efficiency. 
Why would they do this if they believed the Nice Treaty 
rules would work? 
The Constitutional Treaty process was politically painful 
for many EU members, so revealed preference reasoning 
tells us that the EU leaders must have believed that the 
Nice Treaty rules were insufficient. After all, they could 
have simply refused Giscard’s double-majority scheme in 
IGC 2003, taken the rest of the Constitution, and the Nice 
Treaty rules would have remained in force. In fact that 
was first option laid out by the Italian Presidency. In 
2003, the EU15 leaders had a clear choice between the 
Nice Treaty voting rules and a new set of rules. The fact 
that they chose the new ones even before they had tried 
the Nice rules tells us that they believed the Nice rules 
would not be sufficient to meet the urgent and obvious 
problems posed by enlargement. In 2004, the EU25 
leaders faced the same choice under the Irish Presidency 
and the outcome was the same – they rejected the Nice 
rules for a dual-majority system.  
Why all this fuss about what EU leaders must have been 
thinking in 2003 and 2004? The answer, of course, is that 
the EU is now operating under the Nice Treaty rules and 
it has no plans to change the situation. If the EU25 
leaders felt these rules were insufficient in 2004, then 
they are likely to think they are insufficient in the future. 
But once again this is getting ahead of the story. 
2.9  Ratification difficulties and ‘un-
necessary’ referenda 
EU Treaties must be part of each member state’s law. 
This means that Treaties must be ratified by each member 
according to its own constitutional requirements. In many 
EU nations, this involves a vote by the national 
parliament. In others, it involves a referendum. For a 
variety of reasons, four EU nations that would normally 
have ratified by parliamentary vote opted for referenda; 
two of these voted ‘no’, one postponed the vote 
indefinitely and the fourth voted ‘yes’. 
Early in the IGC process, British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair declared that the UK would put the Treaty to a 
referendum. This served his domestic political interest in 
that it removed the issue from the 2005 general election 
(Brits could reject the Constitution without rejecting Blair 
who supported it). But it also strengthened Britain’s hand 
in the negotiations. Britain could credibly claim that any 
Treaty that was too integrationist would be rejected by 
UK voters. Soon afterwards, French President Jacques 
Chirac also announced that he would put the Treaty to a 
popular vote. Again, this served his domestic political 
aims (the opposition Socialists were deeply divided over 
the Constitution and a referendum was expected to 
damage their cohesion before the 2007 presidential 
election, and in fact it did just that). It may also have been 
viewed as a necessary counterweight to the ‘ultimatum’ 
created by the British referendum. 
The Dutch referendum was called for by the Dutch 
parliament – and this against the wishes of the Christian 
Democrats, the biggest government coalition party. The 
Dutch referendum was to be the first ever held in the 
Netherlands since it became a parliamentary democracy 
in 1848. The vote was not to be legally binding although 
all parties agreed to respect the outcome. Likewise, 
Luxembourg scheduled a consultative referendum – its 
first since referenda got a very bad reputation in Europe 
in 1936 – and the parliament promised to respect the 
outcome.
33 The outcome of the unusual French and Dutch 
votes are well known while the outcome of the UK 
referendum will probably never be known. 
Luxembourgers voted ‘yes’ by a wide margin; the 
Luxembourg Parliament approved the Treaty two weeks 
before the referendum.  
3.  Conjecture about the Future 
Enlargement of the EU would require institutional reform 
– everyone knew that. But so far the EU has failed to 
reform itself sufficiently. It tried and failed with the 
Amsterdam Treaty. It tried and failed with the Nice 
Treaty. The failure of the Nice Treaty reforms was so 
obvious to EU leaders that they agreed to reform the 
reforms even before the reforms had been tried. Since 
there are no plans to reverse the French and Dutch 
rejections of Try #3, the Constitutional Treaty, we 
probably have to count the Constitution as the third 
failure to redress the urgent and obvious institutional 
reforms made necessary by Eastern enlargement. The 
problem is that the Nice reforms that are so obviously 
flawed are now rules that govern the EU25. And they will 
continue to govern the EU until a new Treaty comes into 
force.  
Plainly, something will have to be done, but what and 
how?  
3.1  No means no 
One line of thinking rejects the question, asserting that 
the Constitutional Treaty is not really dead. After all, the 
Maastricht and Nice Treaties survived ‘no’ votes. This 
reasoning is based either on wishful thinking or an 
incomplete analysis of the facts. The Dutch and French 
rejections are quite different to the Danish and Irish no’s, 
as Box 2 argues. It seems very unlikely that current or 
future French and/or Dutch governments will ask their 
citizens to vote again on the same Treaty.  
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Box 2. French and Dutch voters are different 
The Danish voted no to the Maastricht Treaty, and the 
Irish said no to the Nice Treaty, but both entered into 
force. In those cases, EU leaders provided the reluctant 
voters with various assurances, and the voters reversed 
their rejections in second plebiscites. One might think the 
same could happen now, but the situations are really quite 
different. 
First, the number of no-voters involved is quite 
different. In the first Irish poll on the Nice Treaty, less 
than a million people voted and only 530,000 said ‘no.’ 
In the French plebiscite, 29 million voters cast ballots 
with 15.5 million saying no. In the Netherlands, the 
61.5% no-vote meant 4.7 million Dutch rejected the 
Treaty. While EU leaders could ‘work around’ 530,000 
nay-sayers, it is hard to ignore a ‘no’ from 20 million 
voters.  
Second, in the Irish and Danish cases, leaders could 
identify specific concerns held by specific groups of no-
voters and this allowed them to make compromises that 
ensured enough no-voters would switch their minds in a 
second vote. EU leaders assured Danish voters that they 
would extend to Denmark the ‘opt out’ that Britain had 
won in the Maastricht Treaty concerning the right to stay 
out of the eurozone. In the case of the Irish ‘no’, the 
solution was to provide assurances that the Nice Treaty 
would not be a threat to Irish neutrality (an important 
concern to several fringe voting groups). In the case of 
the French and Dutch votes, it is impossible to identify 
enough specific, changeable issues to ensure the outcome 
would be different the second time around. In the case of 
France, a large swath of the no-voters seemed to reject 
the economic integration that has been the heart of the 
Europe since the Treaty of Rome. The same was true of 
the French near-no on the Maastricht Treaty, but at least 
in that case voters could understand what would be 
gained from the Treaty. The French political elite, and 
Jacques Chirac in particular, never managed to explain 
exactly why the Constitution was necessary.  
3.2  Renegotiation will not be politically 
attractive 
Another line of thinking asserts that the Constitutional 
Treaty can be renegotiated. This option is blocked, 
according to my thinking. The EU15 leaders never 
explicitly asked for a Constitution because they could not 
agree that the EU actually needed one. In the end, the 
Constitution’s ad hoc nature was necessary to line up an 
ad hoc coalition of idiosyncratic national concerns behind 
the Constitution. This ad hoc nature is exactly why no 
one could ever explain exactly why Europe needed the 
Constitution it had lived without for half a century and 
five enlargements. The real argument – that Europe 
needed to fix the Nice foul-up – was not one that leaders 
like Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair could make since 
they told voters that the Nice Treaty was good enough.  
Getting the 15 to agree to negotiate a new Constitution 
would be hard. But things are much worse now. 
Renegotiating the Constitution today would require the 
unanimous agreement of 25 (soon 27) nations. 
Importantly, many citizens in these new members have a 
view of EU integration that is based on a very different 
historical context. For instance, most of the leaders of the 
10 new member states grew up in nations where the 
secondary-school history books blamed WWII on 
capitalism, not destructive nationalism as in the West 
European history books. Thus the ever-closer-Union-is-
necessary-for-peace perspective – a perspective that still 
holds a great deal of currency in Western Europe – 
creates much resonance among Central and Eastern 
European voters. Indeed, few leaders in these nations 
view the pooling of national sovereignty as a ‘plus’ of 
European integration. National security and the economic 
aspects of integration are the key benefits of EU 
membership; the pooling of sovereignty is viewed as a 
necessary sacrifice at best. This sort of attitude has 
become especially apparent in Poland recently. What this 
means is that one of the strongest forces for a renewed 
Constitution – the desire to ensure that enlargement does 
not end the European dream, the EU’s continued drive 
towards an ever-closer union – is not nearly as strong in 
the EU25 as it was in the EU15.  
Many of the new members are als o at odds with ‘Old 
Europe’ on matters of social policy, taxation and labour 
market regulation at the EU level. The Constitutional 
Treaty did not, in so many words, implement Social 
Europe, but it slipped the thin edge of the wedge into the 
crack that might have become Social Europe. The 
combination of removing the pillars and adopting the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (which includes many 
articles covering social policy) introduced a great deal of 
uncertainty into EU law. No one can know how the 
contradictions between the Charter and EU members’ 
national laws would have been resolved, but it is quite 
possible that the federalist instincts of the Court and the 
Commission would have – over time – led to an 
expansion of EU control of the labour and welfare 
policies of EU members.
34 But this is not a goal that is as 
widely cherished in the newcomers’ polities. Many of 
their citizens envy Irish income growth and British job 
creation, not the stagnation and unemployment that seem 
to be associated with French and German labour market 
institutions.  
As we saw in the debate over the Services Directive, the 
new members are likely to view the imposition of West 
European social policies as a way of robbing them of 
their competitive edge. The social policies that are right 
for a rich nation like France might do a good deal of 
economic harm to nations like Lithuania or Latvia whose 
income levels are on par with developing countries like 
Mexico, Chile and Gabon.  
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against Chirac, but it was an ‘own goal’ as far as Social 
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As noted above, the new member states had little or no 
input into the critical issues decided in the Treaty of Nice, 
which remains in force until another Treaty is passed, or 
in the Constitutional Treaty since they had no vote over 
the Laeken Declaration, no say in the Convention’s 
agenda and their voices could not block a consensus at 
the Convention. Things will be quite different during any 
renegotiation of the Constitution. Each new member will 
have a veto over everything from the renegotiation’s 
agenda to the final text. They will use these to shape any 
new Constitution more to their preferences. Since these 
preferences are, on the whole, at least as economically 
liberal and less federalist than those in the average EU15 
nation, any renegotiated Treaty is likely to be less to the 
liking of groups pushing for a more ‘social’ and more 
federalist Europe.  
Once this becomes clear, no EU leader will push really 
hard for a renegotiation. Of course, some EU leaders will 
talk up the renegotiation issue to please their 
constituencies, but the leaders in power are unlikely to be 
willing to make the compromises necessary to launch 
talks knowing that the result is likely to be less pro-
integration than the current version. The leaders who 
speak so starkly about the absolute necessity of the 
Constitution fear that Europe’s progress to the ‘European 
dream’ – la finalité politique – will grind to a halt without 
the pro-federalist elements of the current Constitutional 
Treaty. But it is exactly these elements that face the 
highest risk of being excluded from a renegotiated text. 
Moreover, since the 2007-13 Financial Perspective was 
viewed as having short-changed the new member states, 
we will not have a situation like the one in 1986, where 
the then-poor Iberian newcomers joined a club that had 
just doubled its spending on poor regions. The 2007-13 
Financial Perspective cuts out any prospect of using the 
EU budget to provide financial sweeteners for the new 
members.  
3.3 Next  steps 
Enlargement-linked institutional reform has been debated 
long and hard since the early 1990s. Hard bargaining has 
pared down the agenda to the bare essentials – reform of 
the Council voting rules and reform of the Commission’s 
composition. None of the other institutional changes in 
the Constitution are essential to allow the EU to function 
effectively and legitimately – if they had been, then they 
would have been discussed in the IGCs that led to the 
Amsterdam Treaty and/or the Nice Treaty. The removal 
of the pillars, the Passerelle and inclusion of the Social 
Charter were included in the Constitution to balance the 
trade-off between federalists and intergovernmentalists 
that has plagued the EU since its start. Some aspects of 
these measures may be part of the next grand bargain, but 
there may be other ways of accomplishing the same 
balance. There is, by contrast, no way to avoid Council 
and Commission reform, especially the former.
35 
If the constitutional route is blocked by big and small 
obstacles, how can the necessary reforms be adopted?  
The obvious point to make here is that the Nice Treaty 
reforms have been in place for less than two years. A 
wait-and-see-how-it-works tactic is thus likely to be part 
of any answer. Since 2001, my co-authors and I 
(especially Mika Widgrén) have written that the Nice 
Treaty rules will cripple the EU’s ability to act, and 
several other groups of analysts have come to the same 
conclusion. If the academic calculations hold true, the 
wait-and-see approach will produce a string of decision-
making crises that will help form a consensus in the 
EU27 – a consensus that the voting rules must be 
reformed and that narrow national interests are getting in 
the way of the progress that all EU nations want. It was 
exactly this sort of atmosphere that induced EU leaders to 
give up so much power in the Single European Act. EU 
leaders had tried the ‘Old Approach’ to Single Market 
liberalisation, with its unanimous voting, for 10 years 
with almost no success. After 10 years of failure, it was 
easy to find a consensus on the idea of formally agreeing 
to use majority voting (instead of unanimity) on Single 
Market issues – and this despite the fact that it reduced 
member states’ ability to block directives they disliked 
(switching to majority voting reduced each member’s 
power to block). Note that there are observers who 
believe the Nice rules are working well (Kurpas & 
Schönlau, 2006), but I would argue that the new member 
states were on these ‘best behaviour’ up until December 
2005. The point is that they were hoping for favourable 
treatment in the 2007-13 budget plan and so did not want 
to rock the boat too much, especially when they were just 
learning how EU decision-making works on the inside.  
I believe we are already seeing this consensus start to gel. 
Each decision-making crisis swells the number of 
European leaders who publicly embrace the Nice-rule-
are-broken view. As the British Prime Minister said in a 
recent speech: “I accept we will need to return to the 
issues around the European Constitution. A European 
Union of 25 cannot function properly with today's rules 
of governance. Having spent 6 months as EU President, I 
am a good witness to that.”
36 I believe that at some stage, 
a ‘tipping point’ will be reached and a broad consensus 
will emerge in the EU27 that an institutional reform is 
necessary. It is impossible to predict what collection of 
sweeteners will be necessary to get the deal done, but it is 
easy to predict that the core of the grand bargain will 
involve the issues identified by the European Council in 
1993 – Council of Ministers voting and composition of 
the Commission.  
                                                        
35 The Nice Treaty’s reform of the Commission composition 
should work well up until the 28
th member joins. 
36 Speech on 2 February 2006, at the European Studies 
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It is notoriously difficult, however, to predict when a 
tipping point will occur. It seems safe, however, to 
suppose that it will not happen before 2008 or 2009. The 
next enlargement (Bulgaria and Romania) has long been 
foretold and will almost surely happen in 2007 or 2008. 
Once that is done, eyes will turn to the next enlargement 
(Croatia? other Balkan nations? Turkey?). At that point, 
the need to reform EU institutions may look fresh enough 
and the cumulative negative experience with the Nice 
Treaty institutions may look disappointing enough to 
justify a new treaty-revision exercise. Perhaps more 
importantly, almost all the national leaders who signed-
off on the Nice reforms in December 2000 will be out of 
office by then; their successors will thus have someone to 
blame for the Nice shortcomings.  
But all this is just conjecture over which reasonable 
analysts could differ. Only time will tell. In the 
meantime, we should re-start our thinking on what the 
optimal institutional arrangements for the enlarged EU 
should look like. The Westendorp Report would not be a 
bad place to start. 
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